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Looking Beyond Full Relationship 
Recognition for Couples Regardless of 
Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or 
Functionalism 
Edward Steint 
Introduction 
Almost forty years ago, Jack Baker and Michael McConnell 
went to the clerk of the court's office in Minneapolis, Minnesota to 
file an application for a marriage license. 1 At the time, Baker was 
finishing his first year of law school at the University of 
Minnesota2 and was a leader of the University's gay student 
group.3 McConnell, who had been romantically involved with 
Baker for just under three years, had recently moved to the Twin 
Cities and received an offer to work as a University librarian.4 
They knew that Minnesota's marriage law did not explicitly say 
that a man could only marry a woman and that a woman could 
only marry a man, 5 and hoped to take advantage of this omission 
and be married in Hennepin County, Minnesota.6 Their 
application for a marriage license was denied by the county 
attorney, who opined that granting Baker and McConnell such a 
t. Vice Dean, Professor of Law, and Director of the Program for Family Law, 
Policy and Bioethics, Cardozo School of Law; J .D., Yale University; Ph.D., 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.A., Williams College. This Essay was 
prepared for a keynote address for the Law and Inequality Symposium at the 
University of Minnesota Law School on April 9, 2010 titled "Family Values: Law 
and the Modern American Family." Thanks to Joanna Grossman, Solange! 
Maldonado, and Steve Lin for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
Essay. Portions of this Essay are reprinted, with permission, from Edward Stein, 
Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two Strategies in the Struggle for Lesbian 
and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 567 (2009). 
1. Jack Star, The Homosexual Couple, LOOK, Jan. 26, 1971, at 69, 70. 
2. Id. at 69. 
3. Id. at 71. 
4. Id. at 70. 
5. MINN. STAT. § 517.02 (1967) (amended 1973) ("Every male person who has 
attained the full age of 21 years, and every female person who has attained the full 
age of 18 years, is capable in law of contracting marriage, if otherwise competent.") 
Minnesota law now explicitly prohibits same-sex marriage. MINN. STAT. § 517.03 
(2008) . 
6. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971). 
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license would "result in an undermining and destruction of the 
entire legal concept of our family structure in all areas of law."7 
Baker and McConnell were undeterred. They wanted to get 
married and thought it was unjust that they were unable to, so 
despite the social stigma associated with gay marriage, the two 
men enlisted the help of an attorney affiliated with the Minnesota 
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and filed an action 
to force the state to issue them a marriage license.8 Not 
surprisingly, they lost at trial, they lost on appeal to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court,9 and the U.S. Supreme Court 
dismissed their appeal "for want of a substantial federal 
question."10 Not only did they lose their case, but the University 
rescinded the offer to hire McConnell because of his gay activism. 11 
McConnell's suit to force the University to hire him as promised, 
although successful at trial, ultimately failed on appeal.12 
In the 1970s, same-sex marriage was not a universal goal for 
advocates of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
rights. While Baker and McConnell were members of a University 
7. Star, supra note 1, at 70 (quoting George Scott, Hennepin County 
Attorney}. 
8. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185. 
9. Id. 
10. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.). Interestingly, various courts 
hearing cases related to same-sex marriage still discuss the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision to dismiss Baker's appeal. Some courts, in decisions that have ruled 
against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) relationship recognition, 
have found that when the Supreme Court dismissed Baker's and McConnell's 
challenge to Minnesota's marriage law "for want of a substantial federal question," 
the Court was taking a position on whether prohibiting same-sex marriages 
violated the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 
F.3d 859, 870-71 (8th Cir. 2006) (praising the Supreme Court's dismissal of Baker, 
and stating there is "good reason for this restraint," as public sentiment can be 
relevant to the creation of a new constitutional right); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 
2d 1298, 1304-05 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that the Supreme Court's dismissal of 
Baker is binding precedent that mandates dismissal of a lesbian couple's suit for 
marriage recognition in Florida). Other courts have found that when the Supreme 
Court summarily denies an appeal, as it did in Baker, the Court is not expressing a 
view on the underlying issue. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 
590-91 (Sup. Ct. 2005), affd, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006) ("While the Supreme 
Court's dismissal of an appeal is a ruling that the judgment appealed from is 
correct, it does not reflect agreement as to the merits of the constitutional question 
addressed. Accordingly, the dismissal of an appeal lacks the precedential value of 
decisions reached after briefing and oral argument on the merits." (citations 
omitted)). 
11. Star, supra note 1, at 70. 
12. See McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev 'd, 451 
F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972) . This was not the end of 
Baker and McConnell's legal battles. See also McConnell v. United States, 188 F. 
App'x 540, 542 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying McConnell's request for a federal tax 
refund arising from his alleged marital status). 
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of Minnesota gay student group, some members of this group 
disagreed with the couple's legal strategy, and many members of 
the group opposed their focus on marriage. 13 In fact, in the 1970s, 
the more vocal advocates of LGBT rights were so-called gay 
liberationists, who wanted more than equal treatment: gay 
liberationists wanted to change the very structure of society, to 
liberate the "homosexual in everyone."14 For example, shortly 
before Baker and McConnell sought a marriage license, a leader of 
the Gay Liberation Front denounced marriage "as one of the most 
insidious and basic sustainers of the system [that oppresses sexual 
minorities]."15 Also, around that same time, another gay 
liberationist took a similar position: ''Traditional marriage is a 
rotten, oppressive institution .... Gay people must stop gauging 
their self respect by how well they mimic straight marriages .... 
[S]howing the world that 'we're just the same as you' is avoiding 
the real issues, and is an expression of self-hatred."16 
Gay liberationists' negative view of marriage was, in part, 
connected to feminist critiques of marriage. The Stonewall-era 
LGBT rights movement had deep connections with the 
contemporaneous women's rights movement (as well as the civil 
rights movement more generally), a movement with significant 
anti-marriage and marriage reform sentiments. 17 Marriage was 
seen as an institution that, both legally and socially, 
disempowered women and treated men and women differently. 18 
The anti-marriage attitudes of gay liberationists were thus 
influenced by the fact that same-sex couples were not allowed to 
marry, but also by the connection to the women's rights 
movement. 
Despite opposition to marriage for same-sex couples in the 
general public and even within the gay community, when Baker 
13. See KEN BRONSON, A QUEST FOR FULL EQUALITY 6 (2004), http://www.may-
18-1970.org. 
14. Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social 
Construction, SOCIALIST REV., May-Aug. 1987, at 9, reprinted in FORMS OF DESIRE: 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 239, 256 
(Edward Stein ed., 1990). See id. at 252-53 (discussing the liberationists and their 
goals) . 
15. Gay Revolution Comes Out, RAT, Aug. 12-26, 1969, at 7, quoted in WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 231 n.6 (1996). 
16. Carl Wittman, A Gay Manifesto (1969-70), in OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES 
OF GAY LIBERATION (Karla Jay & Allen Young eds., 1972), reprinted in WE ARE 
EVERYWHERE: A HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS 380, 383 
(Mark Blasius & Shane Phelan eds., 1997). 
17. See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 337-46 
(1998). 
18. Wittman, supra note 16, at 383. 
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and McConnell began their quest for a marriage license, they were 
publicly confident about the likelihood that they would be allowed 
to marry, but they must have known that their lawsuit was a long 
shot. 19 Today, in contrast, it is quite plausible to say that full 
marriage equality20 is inevitable, even though I am far from 
certain that same-sex couples throughout the United States will 
have equal access to legal recognition in my lifetime.21 Despite my 
hesitance to predict when there will be full marriage equality for 
LGBT people across the country, I am confident that now is an 
appropriate moment to reflect on whether full access to marriage 
regardless of the sex of the parties is the ideal end state for the 
reform of the law of adult domestic relations, in light of the 
demand by LGBT people for legal recognition for their 
relationships. So my question is the following: should advocates of 
justice, fairness (both generally and for LGBT people specifically), 
and good family law be striving for marriage equality, or for 
something else? Of course, no advocate of LGBT rights would say 
that marriage is the be-all and end-all of LGBT rights; every 
LGBT rights advocate would agree that there is much to 
accomplish outside the law of adult domestic relations. My thesis 
is more radical: even with respect to relationship recognition for 
same-sex couples, we should look past same-sex marriage.22 In this 
19. The preceding discussion of Baker and McConnell's lawsuit is adapted from 
my Essay in the book Family Law Stories. See Edward Stein, The Story of 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health: The Bumpy Road to Marriage for Same-
Sex Couples, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 27 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008). 
20. The project of attaining equal access for LGBT people to marriage and the 
associated rights, benefits, duties, and obligations is often referred to as the quest 
for marriage equality. When marriage equality is achieved, there will be no 
restrictions on entrance to marriage indexed to the sex of the people who are 
marrying. The locution "same-sex marriage" is problematic because (1) it elides 
important issues related to relationship recognition for transgender people and (2) 
it makes it seem like the marriage that LGBT people want access to is somehow a 
different kind of marriage. Despite these problems, I will sometimes use that 
locution because, in many contexts, it is more felicitous than alternatives. 
21. Some jurisdictions have embraced equal benefits for same-sex couples 
without embracing marriage equality. For example, some courts that have ruled in 
favor of legal recognition of same-sex relationships have held that giving equal 
benefits without giving the name marriage satisfies the constitutional principles of 
equality and liberty. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 223-24 (N.J . 2006); Baker 
v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886-87 (Vt. 1999). Other courts have held that creating 
an alternative relationship-recognition scheme for same-sex couples does not 
comport with the principle of equality. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P .3d 384, 452 
(Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481-82 (Conn. 2008); 
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906-07 (Iowa 2009); Opinions of the Justices to 
the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571-72 (Mass. 2004). 
22. Other LGBT rights activists , allies, and scholars have argued for looking 
past marriage for same-sex couples, although they have not embraced the proposal 
that I do here. See, e.g., NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: 
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Essay, I survey three alternative proposals to full relationship 
recognition for same-sex couples or marriage equality. Briefly, the 
three alternatives are: (1) the abolition of marriage, (2) the 
development of a "menu" of alternatives to marriage, and (3) the 
embracing of a functionalist approach to relationship recognition. 
In the end, I favor a combination of functionalism and the menu 
approach rather than abolition or the more straightforward goal of 
marriage equality.2a 
Before I turn to a discussion of these three alternative 
projects, some context is appropriate. The legal situation for LGBT 
people in the United States has changed dramatically in the past 
forty years. In 1970, forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia criminalized sodomy, which included most forms of 
consensual sex between two men and some sex acts between two 
women.24 Discrimination against LGBT people was legal under the 
law of every jurisdiction in the country-it was not until 1977 that 
the District of Columbia passed the first anti-discrimination law 
that protected LGBT people.25 In addition, at the time, no state or 
other jurisdiction provided any form of legal recognition for 
couples consisting of two men or two women-in 1984, Berkeley, 
California adopted the first domestic partner policy that allowed a 
city employee to get health benefits for his or her registered 
partner.26 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 8-10 (2008) (advocating a "valuing-all-
families strategy" that reexamines "laws that distinguish between married couples 
and everyone else" by "demanding a good fit between a law's purpose and the 
relationships subject to its reach"); Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic 
Vision For All Our Families and Relationships, http://www.beyondmarriage.org 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (displaying a statement signed by activists, scholars, 
and others that looks beyond the goal of same-sex marriage to broader societal 
reforms). 
23. My goal in this Essay is neither to fully develop nor defend my proposed 
alternative to the simple quest for marriage equality. Rather, I here sketch my 
proposal and some of its virtues and vices relative to some other proposals. I do not 
discuss two other proposals for change in marriage law, namely, altering the rights, 
benefits, duties, and obligations that go with marriage and alterations related to 
incest and polygamy. 
24. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS 161 (2008). The 
exceptions were Illinois, which repealed its sodomy law in 1961, and Connecticut, 
which did so in 1969. Id. at 124-27, 161-63. In 1971, Idaho repealed its sodomy 
laws, but upon learning that gay rights advocates cheered this repeal, reinstated 
the laws in 1972. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6605 (2004); see ESKRIDGE, supra, at 182-
84. 
25. D.C. CODE § 1-2501 (1977) (current version at § 2-1401.01 (2008)). Five 
years later, Wisconsin was the first state to pass such a law. WIS. STAT. § 101.22 
(1982) (current version at§ 106.50 (2008)). 
26. ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 59. 
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Today, no state criminalizes adult consensual sex between 
two people of the same sex after Lawrence v. Texas27 held such 
laws to be unconstitutional.28 Twenty-one states and the District of 
Columbia now have laws that protect against sexual-orientation 
discrimination, and sixteen of these also protect against 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity and/or gender 
expression (that is, they protect transgender people against 
discrimination).29 Fifteen states and the District of Columbia 
provide some legal recognition for same-sex relationships,30 and in 
six states, the majority of justices of the highest courts have held 
that the failure to give equal benefits to same-sex couples as 
compared to different-sex couples violates their state 
constitutions.31 Although the liberationist approach to LGBT 
rights has waxed and waned in popularity over the past forty 
27. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
28. Id. at 578; see also id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the 
result in Lawrence without overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
The next two paragraphs of this Essay are adapted from Stein, supra note t , at 
568-69 (citations added). 
29. The jurisdictions that ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and gender identity/expression are California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Human Rights 
Campaign, State Laws, http://www.hrc.org/laws_and_elections/state.asp (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2010). The states that ban discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation-but not gender identity/expression-are Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin. Id. 
30. The list of those jurisdictions legally recognizing same-sex relationships is: 
Connecticut (marriage); the District of Columbia (marriage); Iowa (marriage); 
Massachusetts (marriage); New Hampshire (marriage); Vermont (marriage); New 
Jersey (civil union); California ("robust" domestic partnership-from May to 
November 2008, California allowed same-sex marriages, and still recognizes these 
marriages); Nevada ("robust" domestic partnership); Oregon ("robust" domestic 
partnership); Washington ("robust" domestic partnership); Maine (limited domestic 
partnership); Maryland (limited domestic partnership); Wisconsin (limited 
domestic partnership); Colorado (designated beneficiary, which is the equivalent of 
a limited domestic partnership); and Hawaii (reciprocal beneficiary, which is the 
same as a limited domestic partnership). Id. While Maryland, New York, and 
Rhode Island do not allow same-sex couples to marry or obtain civil unions, they 
recognize (or at least probably would recognize) valid same-sex marriages from 
other jurisdictions. Id. 
31. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 
48 (Cal. 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); 
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. 
State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); cf. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) 
(holding that the failure to allow same-sex couples to marry raised serious equal 
protection concerns and remanding the case to determine whether the state could 
satisfy the associated heavy burden of justifying differential treatment of same-sex 
couples). 
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years, in light of the prominence and success of the quest for 
marriage equality, even many LGBT activists previously opposed 
to such a focus have come to embrace the quest for marriage 
equality.32 
Socially, the changes have been more dramatic. Whereas 
same-sex sexual attraction was once called "the love that dare not 
speak its name,"33 many LGBT people are now open about their 
desires, relationships, families, and sexual behavior. LGBT 
concerns are widely discussed in the national and local media; 
LGBT people are often favorably and compellingly portrayed in 
films and on television; and Americans in general, and younger 
generations in particular, have dramatically more positive 
attitudes towards LGBT sexuality, LGBT people, and their 
relationships and families. 34 For those of us who experienced the 
virulent homophobia and heterosexism that was the norm in the 
not-so-distant past, it is hard to believe how much the situation for 
LGBT people has improved. 
Since 1970, marriage itself has also changed dramatically, 
even setting aside the advent of the legal recognition for same-sex 
couples in some jurisdictions. Over the past forty years, divorces 
have become easier to obtain, due primarily to the move from fault 
to no-fault divorce;35 most gender asymmetries in the formal 
family law-that is, statutory, regulatory, and common law-have 
32. See Carlos A. Ball, Symposium: Updating the LGBT Intracommunity 
Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 497 (2009). Ball explains: 
[T]he LGBT community during the 1970s and 1980s was divided, as it is 
today, on the issue of whether the institution of marriage should be 
expanded to include same-sex couples or whether its social, legal, and 
economic significance should instead be minimized. What is different today 
Id. 
is that the movement's leaders, including its lawyers, now almost 
uniformly support the pursuit of marriage equality as a civil rights goal. 
33. Lord Alfred Douglas, Two Loves, THE CHAMELEON (1894), available at 
http://www.la w. umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/wilde/poemsofdouglas.htm. This 
phrase became vital in the trials of literary giant Oscar Wilde, when a prosecutor 
asked Wilde to define the "love that dare not speak its name." Lucy McDiarmid, 
Oscar Wilde's Speech From the Dock, 15 TEXTUAL PRAC. 447, 453 (2001). 
34. See, e.g., Dennis A. Golden, The Policy Considerations Surrounding the 
United States' Immigration Law as Applied to Bi-National Same-Sex Couples: 
Making the Case for the Uniting American Families Act, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL 'y 
301, 312 (2009) ("[S]ince 2000(,] Americans have become more accepting of 
homosexuality. Within the next two years, the majority of Americans will hold the 
opinion that homosexuality is morally acceptable . . . . "). 
35. See generally J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR 
AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997) 
(describing the historical changes in Americans' feelings on the morality of divorce 
and the move towards divorce on demand). 
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disappeared;36 cohabitation is now recognized for some legal 
purposes;37 and procreation is no longer seen as the sole (or even 
central) justification for marriage.38 Some of the changes in the 
institution of marriage are the result of other forces besides the 
LGBT movement, such as the advent of new reproductive 
technologies, the sexual revolution, and the improved position of 
women in society.39 These societal changes are not, however, 
disconnected from the LGBT rights movement-rather, such 
aspects of society have evolved synergistically with changes 
relating to LGBT rights. Women's rights, sexual mores, and LGBT 
rights, although distinct, are in many ways interconnected. 
The social and legal situation for LGBT people is still, 
however, far from perfect.40 Seventy years since the earliest 
rumblings of a gay political movement in the United States and 
forty-one years since the Stonewall rebellion-the so-called birth of 
the contemporary gay rights movement41-the legal situation for 
LG BT people, especially from a national perspective, remains 
problematic. Hate crimes against LGBT people are still 
36. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding that a 
Louisiana statute allowing a husband to unilaterally dispose of jointly held 
property violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) 
(holding that the gender-based scheme exempting wives, but not husbands, from 
any requirement to pay alimony violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). But see Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding 
different citizenship requirements for children of unmarried women who are U.S. 
citizens as compared to children of unmarried men who are U.S. citizens). Gender 
asymmetry remains present, however, in how courts, legislatures, and society think 
about families and in how family law operates in practice. 
37. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (enforcing oral or 
implied cohabitation contracts); Ireland v. Davis, 957 S.W.2d 310 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1997) (interpreting domestic violence laws to include same-sex couples); Dunphy v. 
Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (applying bystander liability to an unmarried 
different-sex cohabitant); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) 
(recognizing a same-sex cohabitant as a family member under housing law); 
Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d 1042 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (applying equitable 
distribution to the property accumulations of an unmarried same-sex couple). 
38. Elsewhere, I have discussed this shift in the way some courts talk about the 
significance of procreation in marriage. See Edward Stein, The ''.Accidental 
Procreation" Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex 
Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403 (2009). 
39. See Harbour Fraser Hodder, The Future of Marriage: Changing 
Demographics, Economics, and Laws Alter the Meaning of Matrimony in America, 
HARV. MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 39, 39, available at http://harvardmagazine.com/ 
2004/11/the-future-of-marriage.html. 
40. See Stein, supra note t, at 569-70. 
41. For a history of this event, see generally MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL 
(1993). For a questioning of the conventional belief that Stonewall was a "founding 
event" of the LGBT rights movement in the United States, see generally JOHN 
D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A 
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940--1970 (1983). 
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disturbingly common,42 LGBT youth are still verbally and 
physically harassed in school, often with the knowledge and willful 
acceptance of teachers and administrators,43 and LGBT people are 
disproportionately targeted for arrest by law enforcement 
officials.44 Public opinion polls still reflect strong negative 
attitudes towards LGBT people. 45 Although the legal situation has 
improved, it is still legally permissible in the majority of states 
and under federal law to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation (or gender identity) in employment, housing, and other 
important contexts.46 The U.S. military, the largest employer in 
the United States,47 discriminates on the basis of sexual 
orientation,48 although that ban is supposedly on its way out.49 A 
42. In 2007, 1265 of the 7624 reported incidents of hate crimes were motivated 
by sexual orientation. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hate Crime Statistics: 
Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders, http://www.fbi .gov/ucr/hc2007/ 
table_Ol.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). Of these, ninety-eight percent were 
directed at lesbians, gay men, or bisexuals. Id. Additionally, in 2007, while the 
number of reported bias incidents nationwide decreased, there was a more than 
five percent increase in reported hate crimes based on the victim's sexual 
orientation. Hate Crimes: Good News on Bias Incidents Based on Race and 
Religion; Bad News on Those Based on Sexual Orientation, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 
2008, at A22. 
43. See EMILY A. GREYTAK ET AL., HARSH REALITIES: THE EXPERIENCES OF 
TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS 9-24 (2009), available at 
http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLSEN_ATTACHMENTS/file/000/001/1375-
l.pdf. In a national survey of school climates, "less than a fifth of students said that 
school personnel intervened most of the time or always when hearing homophobic 
remarks (16%) or negative remarks about someone's gender expression (11%). In 
contrast, students were more likely to report that staff intervened when hearing 
sexist or racist remarks .... " Id. at 11. 
44. AMNESTY INT'L, STONEWALLED: POLICE ABUSE & MISCONDUCT AGAINST 
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE U.S. 12-37 (2005), 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/outfrontlstonewalled/report.pdf. 
45. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, MOST STILL 
OPPOSE GAY MARRIAGE, BUT SUPPORT FOR CIVIL UNIONS CONTINUES TO RISE 
(2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1375/gay-marriage-civil-unions-opinion (noting 
that forty-nine percent of Americans surveyed say homosexual behavior is morally 
wrong); Lydia Saad, Americans Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality , 
GALLUP, June 18, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-
Divided-Morality-Homosexuality.aspx (finding that only fifty-seven percent of those 
polled consider homosexuality an acceptable "alternative lifestyle" and forty-eight 
percent consider homosexuality "morally wrong"). 
46. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
47. See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD 101: An Introductory Overview of the 
Department of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dodlOl/ (last visited Apr. 
10, 2010) . 
48. The military's official policies and the regulations that implement them 
include 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006); U.S. DEF'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 1332.30: 
SEPARATION OF REGULAR COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (1993), amended by CHANGE 1 
TO DOD DIRECTIVE 1332.30 (1994); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 1304.26: 
QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION, 
(1993), amended by CHANGE 1 TO DoD DIRECTIVE 1304.26 (1994); U.S. DEP'T OF 
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significant majority of the states not only prohibit same-sex 
couples from marrying, but they also explicitly deny recognition to 
same-sex relationships that have been validly celebrated in other 
jurisdictions.60 And, for purposes of federal law, marriage is 
explicitly defined as a relationship between one man and one 
woman, 61 which means that legally recognized same-sex 
relationships (for instance, Massachusetts marriages, New Jersey 
civil unions, and Nevada domestic partnerships52) are not 
recognized, for example, for purposes of federal income tax law and 
immigration law.53 
Although there is room for improvement, both the law of 
adult domestic relations and the legal landscape for LGBT people 
have changed for the better. The question remains, from the 
perspective of where we are today, whether advocates of equality 
and reform of laws relating to family law and LGBT people should 
be content with the goal of marriage equality. To help answer that 
question, I discuss, in turn, the three aforementioned alternatives. 
I. Abolition 
Some commentators and scholars have suggested that 
abolishing marriage is, on the one hand, a way of achieving 
marriage equality, while also, on the other hand, an end-state that 
DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14: ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS (1993), 
amended by CHANGE 1 TO DOD DIRECTIVE 1332.14 (1994). For discussion, see 
JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY 
(1999). 
49. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, A Call to Topple Policy for Gays in Armed 
Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at Al. 
50. Forty-one states have either a law or a constitutional amendment (or both) 
explicitly restricting marriage in that state to one man and one woman. The list of 
such jurisdictions excludes Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont. Human Rights Campaign, State Laws, http://www.hrc.org/ 
laws_and_elections/state.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). Almost all of the states 
that restrict marriage to different-sex couples also deny recognition to same-sex 
marriages from other jurisdictions. Id. The exceptions are New York and Maryland. 
Human Rights Campaign, Relationship Recognition Laws Map, http://www.hrc.org/ 
documents/relationship_recognition_laws_map.pdf. 
51. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)) . 
52. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); A3787, 
212th Gen. Assem., 1st Ann. Sess., 2006 N.J. Laws 975; S. 283, 2009 Leg., 75th 
Sess. (Nev. 2009). 
53. See, e.g ., Thomas Prol & Daniel Weiss, Lifting a Lamp: Will New Jersey 
Create a Safe Harbor for Gay and Lesbian Immigration Rights?, N.J. LAW. MAG., 
Apr. 2004, at 22, 23 ("[T]he U .S. Citizenship and Immigration Services . . . 
currently maintains the interpretation that a same-sex marriage does not confer 
spousal status for immigration purposes."). 
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is preferable and/or more feasible compared to marriage equality.54 
Some abolitionists favor getting rid of the legal institution of 
marriage and replacing it with the ten-year-old institution known 
as the civil union. 55 According to this proposal, marriage would 
have religious and social significance, but the state would not 
license marriages, solemnize marriages, or give legal recognition 
to marriages.56 Instead, on this proposal, the state would license, 
solemnize, and recognize civil unions (or some other legal 
institution not called marriage). 57 Marriage would no longer be a 
public institution; it would become privatized. 58 Couples in civil 
unions would have the same benefits, rights, and duties as 
married couples under the current legal regime, but the respective 
sexes of parties seeking a civil union would not matter. In other 
words, same-sex couples and different-sex couples would have 
equal opportunities to get a civil union and would be treated the 
same under the law once they obtained such a union. Couples 
could still get married in a church, in a private ceremony, or 
through whatever process they wanted to, but whether or not two 
people were married would have no legal consequence. This 
approach would achieve equality, rid state-sponsored relationship 
recognition from the sexist baggage associated with marriage-
based, in part, on the history of marriage involving a woman's 
legal identity being swallowed up by her husband upon 
marriage59-and separate the religious aspects from the legal 
aspects of relationship recognition. 
The more radical abolitionist proposal is that the state should 
get out of the relationship-recognition business altogether. My 
54. See, e.g., Tamara Metz, Why We Should Disestablish Marriage, in JUST 
MARRIAGE 99, 102-04 (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004) ("Removing the veil of 
marriage would increase the likelihood that benefits and protections aimed at 
caregiving units would serve their primary functions more effectively."). 
55. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Position for Civil Unions, in 
JUST MARRIAGE, supra note 54, at 63, 65---66 (advocating civil unions as a 
"reasonable middle ground" for a society divided on the issue of gay marriage); Alan 
M. Dershowitz, To Fix Gay Dilemma, Government Should Quit the Marriage 
Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at B15 (arguing that the government should 
only administer civil unions, leaving marriage for religious institutions) . In the 
United States, civil unions were first created in Vermont in 2000. VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2009). 
56. Dershowitz, supra note 55. 
57. Id. 
58. See generally Daniel A. Crane, A "Judea-Christian" Argument for 
Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (2006) (arguing for the 
privatization of marriage from the perspective of traditional Judeo-Christian 
theology) . 
59. See Janet M. Calbo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of 
Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593, 595--597 (1991). 
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colleague Ed Zelinsky, for example, argues that marriage should 
be deregulated: the government should give up its "monopoly'' over 
marriage and thereby allow religious groups, private 
organizations, and any other entities to create "alternative 
versions of marriage."60 This deregulation would lead to the 
emergence of a competitive marketplace for choosing among the 
newly-developed alternative forms of relationship recognition.61 
Zelinsky bases his abolitionist proposal on the claim that 
deregulation would actually strengthen marriage, as well as on 
two other pragmatic claims: (1) the abolition/deregulation of 
marriage fits with the legal and cultural reality that legal 
marriage does not much matter because the rules applied to 
married couples are increasingly also applied to unmarried 
couples, and (2) the abolition of marriage would provide an 
equitable solution to the divisive political debate about marriage 
for same-sex couples.62 
This deregulation approach to the abolition of marriage has 
many of the same virtues as the civil union approach to the 
abolition of marriage; namely, it provides equality with respect to 
state recognition of same-sex and different-sex relationships, it 
frees the state from the sexist traditions associated with marriage, 
and it separates the religious aspects from the legal aspects of 
relationship recognition. According to Zelinsky, deregulation has a 
further pro-marriage benefit: abolishing civil marriage would 
create "a robust and competitive market" for relationship 
recognition, which would strengthen the institution of marriage.63 
Further, deregulation would allow couples whose relationships are 
being recognized to customize their marriages or other forms of 
relationship recognition.64 While states currently allow couples to 
customize their marriages to some extent through prenuptial (or 
postnuptial) agreements, the sorts of changes couples can make 
through such agreements are somewhat limited,65 and such 
60. Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for 
Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163-64 (2006). 
61. Id. Although their theoretical aims are quite different, Zelinsky's proposal 
is somewhat similar to the landmark abolitionist proposal in MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER: THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TwENTIETH 
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228---30 (1995). See also Zelinsky, supra note 60, at 1196--99 
(discussing differences between his proposal and Fineman's). For another early 
abolitionist proposal along the lines of Zelinsky's, see LEONORE J . WEITZMAN, THE 
MARRIAGE CONTRACT 227-54 (1981). 
62. Zelinsky, supra note 60, at 1165. 
63. Id. at 1164. 
64. Id. at 1176--77. 
65. WEITZMAN, supra note 61, at 338; Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" 
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agreements are still fairly rare, especially among couples who are 
marrying for the first time. 66 For the most part, even though 
couples are allowed to enter prenuptial agreements, marriage 
remains a "one size fits all" form of relationship recognition. 
Deregulation would allow couples to move beyond the limitations 
of the present single-option relationship-recognition framework. 
Both proposals for abolition have problems. First, regarding 
the civil union proposal for abolishing marriage, achieving 
marriage equality by abolishing marriage is somehow morally 
unsatisfying. Suppose that after Loving v. Virginia, 67 in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that laws prohibiting interracial 
marriages were unconstitutional,68 the state of Virginia had 
responded by getting out of the marriage business altogether by 
creating civil unions that were available to both interracial and 
intra-racial couples. In so doing, Virginia would have, in effect, 
been saying that it preferred allowing no one to marry in Virginia 
to allowing interracial couples to marry in Virginia.69 While this 
response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Loving would have 
achieved equality in some sense of the term, it would have failed to 
address the underlying racism of Virginia's pre-Loving prohibition 
on interracial marriages. Second, the word marriage currently has 
Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1369 (2001). For example, 
prenuptial agreements are not binding in terms of child support and child custody. 
WEITZMAN, supra note 61, at 339. 
66. Ellman, supra note 65, at 1367-68 n .17. 
67. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
68. Id. at 11. 
69. This hypothetical example is like three real world examples. The first 
comparison is to the so-called massive resistance to desegregation of public schools 
whereby some counties in Southern states simply shut down their public schools 
rather than desegregate. Most famously, in 1956, Prince Edward County in 
Virginia closed all of its public schools in reaction to Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), until the Supreme Court held, in Griffin v. County School 
Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), that such closings were unconstitutional. The second 
comparison is to a city's decision to close all swimming pools rather than 
desegregate them. The Supreme Court held, in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 
217 (1971), that there was no constitutional violation involved in closing swimming 
pools rather than racially integrating them, in part because substantial evidence 
supported the city's claim that the pools were closed to maintain peace and order 
and because the pools could not be operated economically on an integrated basis. A 
third and more direct comparison is how Benton County, Oregon refused to issue 
any marriage licenses for some weeks in 2004 because county officials believed that 
the state marriage law, which allowed different-sex-but not same-sex-couples to 
marry, was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Gay? No Marriage License 
Here. Straight? Ditto., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, at AS. For a discussion of the 
general problem of achieving equality by bringing down the group that is better off 
to the level of those that are worse off, see Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves 
Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 513 (2004). 
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legal implications that mean something important to many 
people.70 While this is something that could be changed over time 
with the advent of civil unions for all couples, the centuries-old 
picture of marriage as being both a legal and spiritual institution 
would be hard to change. Third, while the civil union proposal for 
abolishing marriage makes two changes to existing marriage 
laws-it changes the name of the state's legal institution for 
relationship recognition (that is, from "marriage" to "civil union") 
and, in jurisdictions where same-sex couples cannot already get 
married, it allows same-sex couples access to the same legal 
institution that different-sex couples have access to, with the exact 
same benefits, rights, and duties71-it does not address the current 
"one size fits all" nature of relationship recognition in the United 
States. 
Deregulation, the more radical version of the abolition 
proposal, shares the first problem of the civil union proposal but 
does not share the two other problems. Under the more radical 
abolition proposal, couples can pick from a plethora of types of 
marriages and other relationships that the marketplace would 
presumably develop and make available.72 If the word marriage 
means something to them, two people can decide to get married; if 
they want to avoid the term marriage because of its sexist baggage 
(or for any other reason), then they can get their relationship 
recognized through some other non-marital relationship-
recognition contract. 
The concern, however, is that this embrace of contracts in 
place of state-recognized marriage would create greater problems 
than it would solve. Two of the biggest problems for the proposal to 
deregulate marriage are the increased importance of "default 
rules" under this approach,73 and the enforcement problems that 
70. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, State of the Union, NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 2000, 
at 18, 18-23 (regarding marriage as a fundamental right, and civil unions a 
"second-class" institution that stigmatizes same-sex couples). It is, in part, for this 
reason that same-sex couples and their advocates are sometimes unsatisfied with 
civil unions or domestic partnerships. Id. at 22. 
71. Dershowitz, supra note 55. 
72. Zelinsky, supra note 60, at 1177. 
73. Zelinsky acknowledges the importance of default rules under his proposal, 
but, as two commentators on his paper argued, he does not adequately deal with 
their implications. Id. at 1183; see Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1311, 1314-15 (2006) (wondering if default rules would "operate 
as a shadow regime" such that "the law of marriage contracts" would eventually 
evolve to be indistinguishable from the current "law of civil marriage"); Nancy J. 
Knauer, A Marriage Skeptic Responds to the Pro-Marriage Proposals to Abolish 
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1261, 1266 (2006) (suggesting "that existing 
inequities" could be "reproduced" even if marriage is deregulated). 
2010] Beyond Full Relationship Recognition 359 
deregulation would produce. 74 While an increasing number of 
couples today opt for cohabitation rather than marriage,75 
deregulation may lead more couples to just cohabitate. If 
relationship recognition is deregulated, some couples-faced with 
so many options for relationship recognition-may choose to 
simply not get married. The situation under deregulation may end 
up like the present situation regarding prenuptial agreements: 
couples are allowed to enter contracts that deal with various 
financial and related issues between them both during marriage 
and upon divorce, but few people marrying for the first time in fact 
decide to enter into such agreements. 76 Similarly, default rules 
will be especially important under deregulation if couples select 
marriage contracts that incompletely resolve various issues 
(particularly related to divorce and annulment) presently dealt 
with by the legal regime surrounding marriage. 
The enforcement problem involved in deregulation may be 
even greater. What should courts do with wildly unequal marriage 
contracts? For example, in a case from Washington, D.C., a 
husband and wife signed a postnuptial agreement that required 
the wife, among other things, (1) to do precisely what the husband 
told her to do, (2) to never dispute in public anything the husband 
said, (3) to never withdraw any money from the couple's, the 
husband's, or her own bank account without the express consent of 
the husband, and (4) to generally be completely subservient to the 
needs and desires of the husband.77 The court refused to enforce 
that contract. 78 It is not at all clear if a court would be able to do 
that under a deregulation regime. Similarly, what would courts do 
with marriage contracts that have especially strict liquidated 
damage clauses? For example, imagine a contract under which a 
spouse who commits adultery gives up all claims to marital 
property.79 Generally, the deregulation approach to abolition 
encounters problems dealing with relationships in which one party 
is much more powerful and/or more sophisticated than the other. 
74. See Sanger, supra note 73, at 1315--16 (worrying that enforcing marriage 
contracts under contract law might not be practical). 
75. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of 
Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J .L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2 (2007); Pamela J. Smock, 
Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research Themes, Findings, and 
Implications, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 1, 1 (2000). 
76. Ellman, supra note 65, at 1367 n.17. 
77. Spires v. Spires, 743 A.2d 186, 188 n.2 (D.C. App. 1999). 
78. Id. at 191. 
79. Cf. Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 494 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(invalidating a liquidated damages clause requiring the adulterous spouse to pay 
$50,000 upon divorce). 
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Relatedly, the time and energy courts must spend dealing with the 
dissolution of relationships would increase dramatically under 
deregulation because of the countless different marriage contracts 
that courts would need to interpret. 
Finally, as Carl Schneider argued in his classic article, 
marriage law has a "channeling function."80 The state, by creating 
the legal institution of marriage and offering certain rights, 
benefits, duties, and responsibilities to go along with it, provides 
incentives for people to marry. Even though few people know the 
details of the package of benefits that go along with marriage and 
few people marry for any particular benefit, the state-by creating 
the legal institution of marriage and giving incentives for 
participating in it--<:hannels people into this particular 
relationship form and, by so doing, the state advances a particular 
(although perhaps unarticulated) social policy agenda. Whatever 
agenda the state is advancing by channeling people into 
marriage-whether it benefits the couple, their future children, or 
the state generally-would be lost if marriage is deregulated. 
II. The "Menu" of Alternatives Approach 
Another alternative to the straightforward quest for marriage 
equality is to work towards the development of a plurality of 
relationship-recognition alternatives that includes, but is not 
limited to, marriage. William Eskridge and Darren Spedale have 
talked about this pluralist alternative as a "menu of regulatory 
options [for relationship recognition] offered by the state."81 Among 
the choices on such a menu could be: (1) domestic partnership 
limited to employment benefits (like the status offered, starting in 
the early 1980s, by some cities, counties, municipalities, and the 
like),82 (2) cohabitation status, like that available in Canada and 
some European countries, which involves some economic 
obligations and additional benefits when a couple lives together for 
a substantial period,83 (3) "cohabitation-plus" which, in addition to 
the obligations and benefits that go with cohabitation, provides 
80. Carl E . Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 495 (1992) . 
81. WILLIAM N . ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR 
BETIER OR FOR WORSE? WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 252 (2006); see 
Stein, supra note t , at 585. 
82. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
83. See generally LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF 
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads 
Andenaes eds., 2001) (discussing the global developments in same-sex relationship 
r ecognition). 
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state benefits (in part, to encourage and support economic and 
psychological coupling), health-care proxies, leave from work for 
when one's cohabitant/partner is sick, and the like (such as 
Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary law84 or state domestic partnership 
laws like those in Maine and Maryland),85 (4) civil unions or robust 
domestic partnerships that give the full complement (or almost all) 
of the rights, benefits, and obligations associated with marriage 
under state law,86 (5) marriage, and (6) covenant marriage, 
namely, marriage with only a fault-based path to divorce (adopted 
by a handful of states).87 Some commentators argue that some of 
these options (perhaps marriage, covenant marriage, or both) 
should be open to different-sex couples only,88 while others argue 
that all such forms of relationship recognition should be open to 
couples regardless of the sex of the parties. 89 
The main virtue of the menu approach is that it moves away 
from the "one size fits all" approach to relationship recognition. 
The menu approach allows couples to choose the type of 
recognition they want for their relationships: not only do they get 
to call their relationships what they want to call them, but, more 
importantly, they get to pick-to some extent-what legal 
implications (that is, what rights, benefits, duties, etc.) they want 
to flow from having their relationships recognized. The menu 
approach may seem to lead to a legal regime like the deregulation 
version of abolition, but there are important differences. While 
both approaches are pluralistic, the menu approach is a much 
more constrained pluralism and the state plays a significant role 
in this legal regime: under the menu approach, couples can opt for 
84. HAW. REV. STAT.§ 572C-1 to -7 (2005). 
85. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN.§§ 6-101, 6-202, 6-203 (LexisNexis 2009). 
86. For those jurisdictions that currently offer these types of relationship 
recognition, see supra note 30. 
87. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to -906 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-
11-803 to -811 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:275, 9:307 (2000). These menu 
choices are adopted from ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 81, at 252-57. See also 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FuTURE OF 
GAY RIGHTS 121-26 (2002) (listing a similar menu of options arranged by the 
"degree of unitive commitment expected or entailed in the partners' relationship"). 
For a detailed menu proposal, see, for example, Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: 
From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1479-
548 (2001). 
88. See, e.g., GORAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR 
COHABITATION 1083 n.30 (2008) (indicating that some argue for a new institution 
rather than the right to marry). 
89. Id. at 1083. 
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only the relationship forms that are defined by and offered by the 
state. 
In practice, however, even though more types of relationships 
are being legally recognized than in the past, most couples do not 
have many state-sanctioned relationship-recognition options, 
many couples have only one option, and some couples have no such 
options.90 Further, no state currently offers anything close to the 
above-listed menu of legal statuses and only a handful of states 
offer any couples a choice. In Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas, 
different-sex couples have a choice between covenant marriage, 
which is marriage with only fault-based paths to divorce,91 and 
"regular" marriage. In these jurisdictions, same-sex couples have 
no options for getting their relationships recognized.92 In Colorado 
and Maine, same-sex couples and different-sex couples can register 
as designated beneficiaries or domestic partners, respectively, and 
get some limited benefits.93 Different-sex couples also have the 
alternative of getting married, while same-sex couples do not.94 
The law in Nevada is similar to that of Colorado, but same-sex 
couples in Nevada can register as domestic partners, which gives 
them civil-union-type legal recognition.95 Like New Jersey,96 
90. Note that I am not here counting common law marriage or cohabitation 
formalized through contracts as alternative forms of relationship recognition. 
Common law marriages are alternative pathways to marriage, not alternatives to 
marriage. See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. Cohabitation 
agreements, although they will be enforced in some states, do not count as state 
sanctioned. Furthermore, cohabitation agreements between same-sex couples may 
not be enforced in some states. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT 
STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 143-45 (2006) 
(discussing laws in Virginia, Montana, and Michigan that seem to prohibit same-
sex couples from using contracts to confer any marriage-like rights to each other). 
91. See supra note 87. 
92. See supra note 30. 
93. Colorado's designated beneficiary status gives couples who register the 
right to inheritance benefits, enables them to become each others' health care 
proxies, make decisions about each others' remains after death, visit each other in 
the hospital, and sue for wrongful death, and gives them certain financial 
protections. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-22-101 to -112 (2009). In Maine, domestic 
partners get certain limited health insurance benefits and certain inheritance 
rights. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2009) (domestic partner 
registry); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-101 (1998) (intestate succession); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2741-A (2000) (health insurance benefits). Different-sex 
couples in Hawaii can, in certain circumstances, so long as they are not able to 
marry in Hawaii, register as reciprocal beneficiaries, which entails a similar subset 
of rights and benefits. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (2005). 
94. See supra note 30. 
95. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.100, 122A.200 (2009), with COLO. REV. 
STAT.§ 14-2-104 (2008). 
96. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4 (West 2007). 
2010) Beyond Full Relationship Recognition 363 
California,97 Washington,98 and Oregon,99 same-sex couples in 
Nevada can obtain marriage-like legal recognition, but in Nevada, 
different-sex couples can also get their relationships recognized 
without getting married, because they also have the option of 
registering as domestic partners.1°0 In these six U.S. jurisdictions 
that have adopted a menu approach to relationship recognition, 
only different-sex couples are given a choice; at best, same-sex 
couples are stuck with just one way to get their relationships 
recognized. 
Some commentators have suggested that more menu options 
will emerge gradually through a process of sedimentation.101 The 
idea is that when the law is reformed, a new legal rule or 
institution is added on top of the earlier one rather than the new 
legal rule simply replacing the earlier form. 102 With respect to 
relationships, when a new relationship form is created and more 
benefits are given to certain non-married couples, the old 
relationship that gave fewer benefits continues to exist; in other 
words, it remains as sediment.1°3 However, even in jurisdictions 
where new forms of relationship recognition have emerged, 
sedimentation in fact rarely occurs. In jurisdictions where same-
sex couples were able to obtain domestic partnerships or civil 
unions and then subsequently obtained the right to marry, they 
almost always, at that time, lost the option of obtaining non-
marital recognition for their relationship.1°4 Thus, sedimentation 
has not as yet been a robust phenomenon in the law of adult 
domestic relations in the United States. 
One small exception to this pattern involves domestic 
partnerships in New Jersey for senior-citizen couples. In 2004, 
New Jersey enacted a domestic partnership law, which provided a 
subset of the benefits associated with marriage to same-sex 
couples as well as to different-sex couples consisting of two people 
aged sixty-two or older. 105 After the New Jersey Supreme Court 
97. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 297 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). 
98. WASH. REV. CODE§ 26.60.010 to .901 (2008). 
99. OR. REV. STAT. § 106.300 to .340 (2009). 
100. NEV. REV. STAT.§ 122A.100 (2009). 
101. ESKRIDGE, supra note 87, at 121. 
102. Id. 
103. See Stein, supra note t, at 586--87. 
104. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.3 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (requiring 
domestic partners to either "upgrade" their relationship status or dissolve their 
domestic partnership). 
105. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4 (West 2007). Similar provisions related to senior-
citizen couples exist in other jurisdictions with domestic partnership laws. A slight 
variation is used in California, for example, where different-sex couples can 
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held that the state constitution requires that same-sex couples be 
able to obtain the same rights and benefits that are available to 
different-sex couples who marry,106 New Jersey enacted a civil 
union law that provides same-sex couples access to benefits that 
are equal to the benefits associated with marriage in New 
Jersey. 107 After civil unions were legalized, a sediment of New 
Jersey's old domestic partnership law remained for older couples 
regardless of the sexes involved, although no such sediment 
remained for same-sex couples generally (that is, unless they were 
sixty-two years old or older, a same-sex couple could no longer 
register as domestic partners; they could only register for a civil 
union). 108 The advent of civil unions in New Jersey left only a little 
bit of sediment in the form of domestic partnerships for senior 
citizens. This small amount of sedimentation is one of the few 
examples of this phenomenon in the United States. 
One might justifiably argue that these problems-(1) that 
there are only a handful of jurisdictions that have more than one 
item on the menu and (2) that, even in those jurisdictions, some 
couples have only one menu option available to them-are 
implementation problems. Over time, more jurisdictions will offer 
more than one relationship type to choose from and more 
register as domestic partners if one of them is over the age of sixty-two. CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 297(5)(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). California (and presumably, New 
Jersey) included senior-citizen couples in its domestic partner legislation out of 
concern for retired couples who are cohabitating but who do not marry in order to 
avoid reductions in one or both of their Social Security (or other similar) benefits. 
See Carl Ingram, Davis Signs 3 Bills Supporting Domestic Partners, Gay Rights, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at A24. 
106. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
107. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West Supp. 2009). For a discussion about 
whether civil unions in fact provide equal benefits, see N.J. CML UNION REVIEW 
COMM'N, FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY CML UNION REVIEW 
COMMISSION (2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/lst-
lnterimReport-CURC.pdf. The study finds, in part, that the state's civil union law 
creates "second-class status" for same-sex couples. Id. at 10, 17. 
108. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4(b)(5) . Note, however, that same-sex couples 
who had previously registered as domestic partners in New Jersey could retain that 
status rather than "upgrade" to a civil union. Id. § 26:8A-4.1 ("This act shall not 
alter the rights and responsibilities of domestic partnerships existing before the 
effective date of th[e] act [establishing civil unions], except that eligible domestic 
partners shall be given notice and opportunity to enter into a civil union pursuant 
to the provisions of this act."). So, in this limited sense, the domestic partner status 
remained as sediment. When California, however, changed its domestic 
partnership law from a status that involved a limited number of benefits to a status 
that involved a more robust, civil-union-like set of benefits, there was not even this 
limited sediment; same-sex couples who had registered for the limited domestic 
partnership were given, when the more robust domestic partner benefits were 
passed, the choice of "upgrading" to the more robust domestic partnership status or 
dissolving their domestic partnerships. See CAL. FAM. CODE§ 299.3. 
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jurisdictions will provide equal access to these choices. But even if 
these implementation problems disappear, there may be problems 
with the menu approach. As I mentioned in discussing the 
deregulation version of the abolition approach, it is sometimes a 
problem to give people too many choices. Further, people may not 
understand the differences among the relationship options 
available to them. Finally, it seems that when offered the 
opportunity to choose alternative relationship forms, most U.S. 
families opt for basic marriage, not an alternative to it. 109 
III. Functionalism 
The final alternative approach to relationship recognition 
that I want to discuss is functionalism. Under this approach, the 
characteristics of a relationship-rather than, or in addition to, its 
formal legal status-determine how a relationship should be 
treated under the law. 11° Consider the following examples. Miguel 
Braschi, whose partner died from complications due to AIDS, was 
threatened with eviction from the rent-controlled apartment that 
the two men shared because the lease was in his deceased 
partner's name.111 In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., New York's 
highest court held that Braschi should have a chance to prove that 
he was a "family member" of his deceased partner. 112 A Minnesota 
court took the functional approach in the case of Sharon Kowalski, 
who suffered severe brain injuries in a car accident.113 Kowalski's 
partner, Karen Thompson, wanted to help with Kowalski's 
physical therapy and to help make medical decisions for her.114 
109. See Rick Lyman, Trying to Strengthen an "I Do" With a More Binding Legal 
Tie , N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at Al (reporting that studies have estimated that 
only one to two percent of couples marrying in Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana 
since covenant marriage was legalized have chosen that option). See generally 
Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 1 (Harvard Law 
Sch. John M . Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 
436, 2003), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&context=harvard_olin ("Legal commentators and 
practitioners estimate that only 5-10% of the population enter into prenuptial 
agreements, and one study suggests that only 1.5% of marriage license applicants 
would consider entering into such agreements." (citations omitted)). 
110. For a particular attempt to apply a functional approach to a specific benefit 
of marriage, see Edward Stein, A Functional Approach to the Spousal Evidentiary 
Privilege, 5 EPISTEME 374 (2009). 
111. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50--51 (N.Y. 1989). 
112. Id. at 54-55. The author's analysis of these cases is reprinted with 
permission. Stein, supra note t, at 583-84. 
113. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791-92 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991). For a detailed discussion of this case, see CASEY CHARLES, THE SHARON 
KOWALSKI CASE: LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS ON TRIAL (2003). 
114. Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791-92. 
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Kowalski's father tried to block Thompson's involvement.115 The 
Minnesota court in In re Guardianship of Kowalski held that the 
two women were a "family of affinity."116 In both Braschi and 
Kowalski, the courts held that, even though the couples in 
question were not married, they should be treated in the way a 
married couple would be treated in the specific contexts involved, 
that is, housing law and guardianship law, respectively. 117 By 
looking to the features of a relationship-for example, the 
emotional and financial commitment and entanglement involved; 
the mutual reliance for shelter, food, and health care; and how the 
two people in the relationship have conducted themselves in their 
personal life-the functional approach to relationship recognition 
determines whether a relationship should get a benefit typically 
associated with marriage. 118 The functional approach has also 
been applied to unmarried different-sex couples. For example, in 
Dunphy v. Gregor,119 Dunphy, a woman who had been cohabitating 
for more than two years with a man to whom she was engaged to 
be married, was allowed to bring an action for bystander liability 
after she witnessed her fiance being struck by Gregor's car and 
then had him die in her arms. 120 Although Dunphy and her fiance 
were not married, the court granted her a legal remedy previously 
available only to spouses or close relatives in New Jersey.121 
Functionalism could be construed as a specific way to 
implement abolition. Under this construal of functionalism, 
marriage as a legal status would be abolished and the benefits and 
duties previously associated with marriage would be doled out in 
virtue of whether the couple in question exhibited appropriate 
functional characteristics. But this abolitionist version of 
functionalism is not what I have in mind. Functionalism as I am 
imagining it here supplements, rather than replaces, marriage 
(and also civil unions). Functionalism would thus create a path for 
unmarried/unregistered couples to get some benefits associated 
with relationship recognition. 
Functionalism is not unheard of in marriage law more 
generally. Eleven U.S. jurisdictions recognize common law 
115. Id. at 791. 
116. Id. at 797. 
117. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54-55; Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791-92. 
118. See also Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d 1042, 1047 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that the property accumulations of an unmarried same-sex couple should 
be equitably distributed in the way such property of a married couple would be). 
119. 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994). 
120. Id. at 373. 
121. Id. at 380. 
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marriages, 122 legally valid marriages that are not solemnized in 
the usual ceremonial manner but instead come into existence 
when two people capable of marrying (1) cohabitate, (2) intend and 
agree to be married, and (3) hold themselves out to their 
community as married.123 Part of the contemporary justification 
for recognizing common law marriages is that such marriages 
share many of the functional attributes of standard (ceremonial) 
marriages. 124 
Another functional aspect of marriage law is evident in the 
sham marriage doctrine. This doctrine says that even though a 
couple has gone through all the formal requirements of a 
marriage, including filing the appropriate documents with the 
state, having a ceremony, and the like, their marriage is void if the 
couple has no intention of living together as husband and wife, but 
rather are getting married only for health benefits, the 
legitimization of children, immigration or naturalization purposes, 
or some other limited purpose.125 
122. Common law marriage is recognized in Alabama, Colorado, the District of 
Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Utah. LIND, supra note 88, at 9-10. Note that although the doctrine of 
common law marriage is an example of how marriage law makes use of functional 
characteristics, common law marriage is not an example of functionalism as an 
alternative to marriage. Common law marriages are marriages; they are marriages 
obtained without marriage licenses and the other standard formal procedures for 
marrying. Id. at 5-8, 259-62. 
123. See In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Iowa 1979). 
124. See David S. Caudill, Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation: A 
Proposal to Update and Reconsider Common-Law Marriage, 49 TENN. L. REV. 537, 
566 (1982) ("Although many of the traditional reasons for recognizing common-law 
marriage are no longer relevant, society may benefit from specific legal recognition 
of essentially marriage-like relationships .. . . [b)ecause many of the state's 
interests in marriage are substantive, not formal .. .. " (footnote omitted)). 
125. See United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 919 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(upholding the conviction of a man who brought an illegal alien into the country 
through a sham marriage). The Second Circuit explained: 
If the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it 
as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they 
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, 
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent 
to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not 
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive 
others. 
Id. See also Garcia-Jaramillo v. I.N.S, 604 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding 
sufficient evidence of a sham marriage where the husband approached the wife 
three months before the marriage and offered to pay her two hundred dollars to 
marry him, the husband sought legal residency, and the parties never lived 
together); United States v. Mathias, 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that an 
exception to spousal privilege exists when the marriage is a sham, and the spouse 
may be forced to testify). 
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Common law marriage and the sham marriage doctrine 
exhibit, respectively, what I call positive and negative functional 
factors. A positive functional factor is involved if a relationship 
that does not count as marriage under the traditional/bright-line 
definition of marriage is nonetheless treated like a marriage in 
some way or context in virtue of functional considerations. Thus, a 
positive functional factor is involved in common law marriage 
because under this approach to relationship recognition, if a couple 
holds themselves out as married, intends to be married, and so on, 
then they are counted as married even though they were not 
married in the standard ceremonial manner, because their 
relationship has certain functional characteristics. A negative 
functional factor is involved if a relationship that satisfies the 
traditional/bright-line definition of what qualifies as a marriage is 
not treated as a marriage for some purposes in virtue of functional 
considerations. Thus, a negative functional factor is involved in 
the sham marriage doctrine because if a couple that was otherwise 
capable of marrying got married in the standard ceremonial 
manner but did not have certain functional characteristics-for 
example, if they only married so one of them could get a green card 
and not because of an emotional, romantic, or other bond-then 
they would not qualify as married. 
Although marriage law does have certain functional 
characteristics, for the most part, the law of adult relations follows 
the bright-line approach rather than the functional approach; in 
general, courts are hesitant to apply the functional approach. 
Consider as an illustrative example, the case of People v. Fields. 126 
William and Alice Fields, although legally married, had not been 
living together for six months and William had been living with 
another woman.127 After shooting two people, William called Alice, 
told her about the shootings and said he was coming to her 
home. 128 When he arrived, he suggested he was going to kill Alice, 
but then fell asleep. 129 While William slept, Alice went to the 
police. 130 At William's trial, when the prosecution asked Alice what 
William told her when he called her that day, William tried to 
invoke the adverse testimonial privilege, which precludes 
testimony against a person by his spouse.131 The prosecutor argued 
126. 328 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div. 1972), affd, 289 N.E.2d 557 (N.Y. 1972). 
127. Id. at 544. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 545. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 544. 
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that the court should take a negative functional approach to the 
privilege because there was no marriage left to preserve, as 
evidenced by the couple's separation, William's cohabitation with 
another woman, and William's plan to murder Alice.132 The 
majority of the court refused to take this functional approach, 
holding firm to the bright-line test, namely, that the testimonial 
privilege applied because Alice and William were still legally 
married. 133 
The main virtue of functionalism as an alternative to having 
full marriage equality as the ultimate goal is that it provides 
actual relationships with the benefits and protections that they 
deserve, rather than embracing a legal formalism that recognizes 
only those relationships that are registered. Conversely, by 
rejecting a bright-line test (either one is married or one is not) , 
functionalism is inefficient and hard to administer, both for judges 
and in practice. Functionalism, although it has the virtue of 
scratching only where the itch is, may lead to uncertainty and 
indeterminacy. 
Conclusion 
Having articulated and developed these three alternatives, 
and briefly considered some of their virtues and vices, I now return 
to the question of whether marriage equality is an appropriate 
ultimate goal for family law reformers and advocates of LGBT 
rights. For both strategic and principled reasons, we should shift 
our theory and our advocacy from simple marriage equality to 
developing and implementing both functionalism and a menu of 
relationship-recognition alternatives. 
As an advocate for LGBT rights, I feel strongly that we 
should not lose the movement's ''liberationist" and feminist roots. 
For decades, LGBT people have been-especially when open about 
our sexual orientations-social outcasts and rebels. Part of the 
heritage of that distinctive social position makes us well suited to 
drive change with respect to social institutions, for ourselves, but 
also for others. This change can be achieved within existing social 
structures in some jurisdictions, namely, LGBT people can marry 
people of the same sex and thereby change the norms concerning 
what a legal spouse is. Social change can and should also occur 
outside existing legal institutions. Such change can be 
accomplished by working for recognition of relationship forms that 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 545-46. 
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emerged in the LGBT communities before same-sex marriage was 
a possibility (as well as relationship forms that emerged in other 
contexts for other people), both by creating legal statuses that fit 
these alternative relationship forms and by recognizing, for certain 
purposes, functional relationships. 
Further, as a society, we should offer and buttress protections 
for people who choose not to marry. Relationship recognition need 
not and should not be a "one size fits all" and a "take it or leave it" 
proposition. Just as some people-including some LGBT people 
and feminists-want to embrace marriage because of its social 
meaning, tradition, and religious importance, others-also 
including some LGBT people and feminists-want to reject 
marriage for precisely these reasons, namely because marriage 
has been a central site of the oppression of women, inequality, 
racial separation, and heteronormativity. For these and other 
theoretical and ideological reasons, I think the quest for marriage 
equality should not be our ultimate goal for reforming the law of 
adult domestic relations. 
Additionally, from a practical perspective, there is no 
avoiding the fact that forty-two states now have a law or a 
constitutional amendment (or both) specifically prohibiting legal 
recognition of marriages between people of the same sex.134 These 
legal prohibitions can be challenged through litigation, legislation, 
and voter referenda. But further, in those states, the menu 
approach has promise, as is demonstrated by recent laws for 
relationship recognition passed in Colorado135 and Nevada.136 Both 
of these states have constitutional amendments prohibiting 
marriages between people of the same sex.137 Also, the menu 
approach, because it offers alternatives to different-sex couples as 
well as same-sex couples, provides potential for social and political 
coalitions for change in the legal recognition of relationships other 
than marriage. The functionalist approach also has promise for 
building coalitions in states that have strong prohibitions against 
marriage for same-sex couples, especially, as in Braschi and 
Kowalski, when functionalism is piecemeal and when it emerges in 
specific legal contexts.1as 
134. See supra note 50. 
135. COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 15-22-101 to -112 (2009). 
136. NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 122A.010 to .510 (2009). 
137. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31 ("Only a union of one man and one woman shall 
be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state."); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21 ("Only 
a marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect 
in this state."). 
138. See supra Part III. 
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Of the three alternative approaches discussed above, I would 
reject abolition, at least in the form of deregulation, as both 
impractical and theoretically problematic. I simply do not think 
that the United States is ready now, or would likely be ready 
anytime soon, to get rid of marriage. Further, deregulation would 
take away the various protections (in particular, for the less 
powerful) that exist in marriage law and open up a Pandora's box 
of limitless, unknown, and uncertain options. 
On the other hand, for reasons discussed above, 
functionalism and the menu approach are viable and valuable 
approaches. Additionally, these two approaches complement each 
other: the menu approach gets away from the "one size fits all" 
aspect of the current legal regime by offering some "prescreened" 
options for relationship recognition, while functionalism provides a 
safety net for couples who have not had their relationships legally 
recognized. Further, these two approaches are not in tension with 
marriage equality. Under the menu approach, marriage is one of 
the available alternatives for couples, regardless of the sex of the 
people in them. Functionalism supplements and complements 
marriage and the other options on the relationship-recognition 
menu. 
There are implementation problems for functionalism, but I 
think these problems can be solved, as courts already address 
these issues when dealing with the functionalist aspects of family 
law that presently exist. Elsewhere I have started to develop what 
I call sophisticated functionalism to address these implementation 
problems.139 Under sophisticated functionalism, to determine 
whether a relationship qualifies for some benefit or distinctive 
treatment, a court (or other entity) faced with making a decision 
about how to treat a relationship will look to the relevant aspects 
of the relationship. Depending on the benefit at issue, such aspects 
could include: emotional commitment and involvement; financial 
commitment and entanglement; mutual reliance for personal 
services including shelter, food, clothing, utilities, health care, etc.; 
how parties in a relationship have conducted themselves in their 
personal lives and held themselves out to society; their level of 
intimacy; and the totality of the relationship as evidenced by the 
dedication, caring, and self-sacrifice of the parties. The presence or 
absence of one or more of these factors is not alone determinative 
of whether a relationship qualifies for the benefit in question. 
Rather, the question is whether the character of the couple's 
139. See Edward Stein, Spousal Secrets, in SECRETS OF LAW (Austin Sarat et al. 
eds., forthcoming); see also Stein supra note 110. 
372 Law and Inequality [Vol. 28:345 
intimate relationship is, on the whole and all things considered, 
deserving of the benefit. If so, then the benefit should be granted. 
Under sophisticated functionalism, the burden is on the couple 
with the "unregistered" relationship to show that their 
relationship has the relevant functional attributes. Fiances on 
their way to their wedding could, if they have the appropriate 
functional characteristics, be granted a benefit typically associated 
with marriage or another relationship status, but they would have 
the burden of establishing that they have such functional 
characteristics. Further, under this sophisticated functionalism, a 
married couple, or a couple who has registered for a recognized 
relationship, has a strong but rebuttable presumption that they 
can claim a benefit typically associated with that relationship 
status. This presumption can be rebutted if their relationship was 
a sham or is now moribund, but the burden of rebutting the 
presumption is on the party who thinks that the married or 
registered couple does not deserve the privilege.140 
My conclusion, which is admittedly just a sketch of an 
approach that needs to be developed in greater detail, is that 
compared to simple marriage equality, a better end-state for the 
law of adult domestic relations that would provide both equality 
and quality for LGBT people would be a combination of 
sophisticated functionalism and a menu of at least several legal 
statuses. The range of legal statuses should recognize 
relationships open to couples regardless of the sex of the people in 
them-including marriage (or a status like marriage) and a legal 
status, such as the newly created non-marital relationships in 
Nevada or Colorado, which involve a smaller subset of the benefits 
associated with marriage.141 This combination approach would 
recognize the plurality of relationship forms that exist and 
acknowledge that one size does not fit all, while providing a safety 
net for those who will not sign up for any option offered by the 
state. 
We are near the cusp of a revolutionary moment in family 
law. Rather than let this revolutionary moment pass by simply 
reproducing what already exists, we should try to seize this 
moment and work for the creation of new legal options for 
relationship recognition and the associated human flourishing. 
140. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. 
